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Was Turkey's recovery from debt crisis an export miracle, as
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East?  Or just an accounting trick - the result of a shift from
underinvoicing to overinvoicing? Or a response to sound export
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Alone among major debtor countries, Turkey  being overpromoted?  What pulled Turkey out
substantially lowered its debt-export ratio - by  of debt?
more than a third between 1980 and 1987. But
the driving force behind the Turkish export  Using an econometric model, Arslan and
miracle - indeed, its very existence - have  van Wijnbergen assessed the contributions of
been a matter of debate.  various factors to the Turkish export miraclc,
whose existence they confirm.
Some contend that Turkey's export boom
had little to do with export incentives or ex-  Surprisingly, they leam that import growth
change rate policy but was mostly a conse-  in the Middle East made a negative contribution
quence of Turkey's proximity to the Middle  to Turkey's  1980-87 export boom.  And al-
East.  Others claim that export growth reflected  though there was a switch from underinvoicing
a shift from underinvoicing before 1980 toward  to overinvoicing, this accounting trick was
overinvoicing afterward - a product of ac-  nowhere near enough to explain the export
counting tricks in response to changing incen-  miracle.
tives to be truthful about export receipts.
After extraneous factors such as the oil
If what happened to Turkey is spillover from  boom in the Middle East are accounted for,
its proximity to the Middle East, there is little  Turkey's export miracle was more than a
other countries can learn from the experience.  response to explicit export incentives.  It was a
And if export subsidies were behind Turkey's  result of macroeconomic policies and trade
export growth, are GATT and free trade maybe  reform that allowed a steady real depreciation of
the Turkish lira.
'Pe PRE  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the  findings  of work  under  way  in the  Banr s Policy,  Research.  and  Extemal
Affairs  Complex.  An  objective  of the  series  is to get  these  fminngs  out  quickly,  even  if presentations  are  less than  fully
polished.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  in  these  papers  do  not  necessarily  represent  of  ficial  Bank  policy.
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Turkey's  recovery  from  its  debt  crisis  in 78-80  has ever  since  made  it
the  paragon  of  export  led  growth.  In  striking  contrast  to the  LAtln  American
experience  after  1982,  Turkish  growth  recovered  rapidly,  with  exports  leading
the  way.  Alone  among  the  major  debtor  countries,  Turkey  substantially  lowered
its  debt  export  ratio,  by more  than  a third  between  1980  and  1987.  Real  export
growth  rates  were  close  to those  obtained  in for  example  South  Korea  in the
late  sixties  and  seventies.
But the  driving  force  behind  the  Turkish  export  miracle,  and  in  fact  its
very existence,  have  remained  a  matter  of debate.  Some  have  pointed  to
Turkey's  liberal  provision  of  export  incentives.  Others  have  focused  on the
set  of  macroeconomic  and  import  liberalization  policies  that  caused  Turkey's
agressive  nominal  exchange  rate  policy  to  actually  produce  sustained  real
depreciation  (Anand  et alii  (1988)).
A much  more  skeptical  view  has  been  expressed  by Celasun  and  Rodrik
(1987)  and  Rodrik  (1988).  They  argue  that  not  more  than  30%  of the  increase  in
exports  can  be traced  to the  real  depreciation  of the  TL,  and find  little
empirical  support  for  any  effect  of the  export  incentives.  They  conclude  that
Turkey's  export  boom  had  little  to  do  with the  incentive  regime  or exchange
rate  policy,  but  was  mostly  a consequence  of Turkey's  proximity  to the  Middle
East.  The  fact  that  recorded  data  show  rapid  export  growth  to  the  OECD
countries  too  is,  they  argue,  a consequence  of a shift  from  underinvoicing
before  1980  towards  overinvoicing  after  1980.  This  shift  in invoicing  strategy
was,  they  agree,  a response  to exchange  rate  and  export  incentive  policies,  as
black  market  premia  fell  and  export  subsidies  rose.  Thus  these  policies
produced,  to some  extent,  a chimera  of export  growth,  a  shift  from  unofficial
to  official  exports,  with  no real  underlying  increases  in excess  of  what could
simply  be explained  by the  high  growth  rate  of imperts  into  Iran  and  Iraq.
The  importance  of this  issue  goes  much  beyond  the  merely  academic.  There
is  a  persistent  belief  among  some  observers  (for  example  Balassa  (1978,1985))
that  agressive  export  policies  promote  growth,  a  practitioner's  view  that  has
recently  begun  to  gather  theoretical  support  (Romer  (1989)).  Moreover,  almost
every  study  of creditworthiness  has  shown  the  importance  of debt  export  ratios
in  creditors'  assessment  of sovereign  risk  (McFadden  et alii  (1988)).  But  if
exports  play such  an important  role,  the  policies  that  lead  to  high  export
growth  are  of substantial  interest.  If all  that  happened  in  Turkey  was  a
favorable  spillover  of its  proximity  to the  Middle  East,  there  is  little  other
countries  can  learn  from  the  Turkish  experience.  If  on the  other  hand,  active
export  subsidies  were the  main  determinants  of  Turkey's  export  growth,  one
should  wonder  about  the  costs  of  joining  GATT,  and  whether  the  static
efficiency  gains  of free  trade  have  not  been  promoted  too  much  by its
adherents  (World  Bank  and  IMF,  to  mention  some).  The  third  explanation,  real
exchange  rate  depreciation,  would  put  the  focus  muchl  more  on the  macroeconomic
policies  and  trade  reforms  that  made  such  a depreciation,  where  actively
pursued  through  nominal  exchange  rate  policy,  sustainable  in  real  terms.
Thus  the  rationale  for  what  we pursue  In  this  paper;  an assessment  of
the  relative  contributions  of all  the  factors  mentioned  sofar  to  Turkey's
export  growth.  Our  efefort  starts  with  an  assessment  of  whether  there  was, in
fact,  an export  miracle  once  the  Middle  East  is  discounted;  or was  it all  a
product  of accounting  tricks  in  response  to  changing  incentives  to  be truthful
about  the  true  extent  of export  receipts.  In  Section  2  we compare  Turkey's2
trade  statistics  with  those  reported  by its  main  trading  partners  to  assess
whether  there  was in  fact  significant  growth  to  countries  outside  the  Middle
East.  We then  present  a simple  model  focusing  on the  role  of export
incentives,  relative  prices  and  foreign  income  growth  in  export  determination.
This  model  is  estimated  econometrically  and then  used  for  an assessment  of the
contributions  of the  various  factors  mentioned  to the  Turkish  export  miracle,
a  miracle,  by the  way,  the  existence  of  which  we do confirm.
2  ExRort  incentives  and  Export  Performance
2.1  Export  Developments  in  Turkey.
Since  1980,  Turkey's  trade  strategy  has  shifted  from  interventionist
import  substitution  towards  a  more  market-based  outward  orientation.  Export
growth  over  the  same  period  has  been impressive.  In  volume  terms  growth
averaged  24  percent  per  annum.  As overall  exports  expanded,  the  structure  of
exports  changed  drastically  too,  both in terms  of commodity  composition,  and
markets  reached.
Industrial  exports  grew  spectacularly  during  1980-1987,  from  $  1.0
billion  in  1980  to  $  8.1  billion  in  1987.  Industrial  exports,  which  in 1980
represented  36  percent  of total  Turkish  exports,  had  more  than  doubled  their
share  by 1987.  But  agricultural  exports  remained  at the  same  level  in  value,
with  their  share  in  total  exports  falling  from  57  percent  to 18.2  percent.
The  pattern  of exports  markets  has  also  changed  very  rapidly,  with the
Middle  Eastern  Countries  taking  an increasing  share  (cf  figure  1).  Exports  to
Oil-exporting  Countries  (RXO  in  Fig.l)  jumped  from  $  0.4  billion  (  13.8
percent  of total  exports)  to $ 2.9  billion  (  36.4  percent  of total  exports)  in
1985.  Iran  and  Iraq  have  become  Turkey's  major  export  markets,  mainly  because
of  Turkish  exporters  easy  access  to these  markets,  although  supply  factors  too
must  have  played  a role.  1/  However  since  then  exports  to  oil-exporting
countries  have  stagnated,  as falling  oil  prices  forced  these  countries  to
curtail  their  expenditure  (cf  Fig.  1).
However  Turkish  export  growth  was  much  more than  a spill-over  from  the
Middle  East,  triggered  by buoyant  OPEC  expenditure.  Turkish  exports  to  other
countries,  mostly  the  major  OECD  Countries,  grew  at  an equally  impressive  rate
of 17.5  percent  per  year  on average  (again,  in  volume  terms).  Exports  to  the
OECD  Countries  expanded  in  both labor-intensive  industries  (such  as textile
and  apparel)  and  specialized  products  (mostly  specialized  industrial  and
electrical  machinery).  Low  value  added  exports  consisting  mostly  of  raw
materials  (such  as  processed  food),  diminished  in importance.  Exports  of
textiles,  leather  products,  chemicals,  machinery,  electrical  equipment
expanded  at a  higher growth  rate  than  the  average  of total  exports.  Textiles
and  leather  products  remain  the  largest  exporting  industries,  while  the  iron
and  steel  industry  has  emerged  as the  second  most important  export  industry.
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Figure  1:  Turkey's  exports  (volume)  to  oil  and  non-oil  countries;
RXO  :  exports  to  oil  exporting  countries
RXNO :  exports  to  non-oil  countries,  Turkish  data
RXNOC:  exports  to  non-oil  countries,  trading  partners'  data
To  what  extent  are  all  these  wonderful  export  growth  rates  a chimera,  a
product  of  over-invoicing  and  straight  fictitious  exports?  There  is a  widely
shared  view that  the  Turkish  export  boom  has  been  at least  paTtly  fictitious.
There  Is  in fact  no doubt  that  the  generosity  of subsidies  on in  particular
manufacturing  exports  has  led  many  exporters  to over-invoice  exports.  But
thls  is  not the  whole  story.  There  has also  been  under-invoicing  in  some
periods,  because  of  a  black  market  premium  on  foreign  exchange.  In  order  to
capture  this  premium,  the  Turkish  exporters  would  have  to  underreport  their
export  revenues.
In  this  section,  we  present  an estimate  of the  magnitude  of over  and
under-invoicing  during  the  1970-87  period.  The  analysis  is  based  on  an4
examination  of  partner-country  data.  2/  Turkish  exports  are  recorded  both  by
the  Turkish  authorities  and  by the  importing  country,  so  one  has two  sets  of
statistical  records  with  regard  to  Turkey's  exports.  Apart  from  transpurt  and
insurance  cost,  it  Is  reasonable  to  expect  that  export  value  recorded  at the
port  of shipment  will  exceod  the  import  value  recorded  at the  port  of  entry
whenever  export  over-invoicing  takes  place.  There  is  no reason  to expect  over-
invoicing  by foreign  importers;  after  all  they  do  not  raceive  the  export
subsidies,  and  might  have  to  pay  higher  tariffs  if they  would  over-invoice.
Before  comparing  Turkish  statistics  to  corresponding  trading  partner
trade  data  for  an assessment  of the  extent  of over-  and  under-invoicing,  one
adjustment  needs  to  be  made.  As imports  statistics  are  recorded  on  a c.i.f
basis  while  export  statistics  are  recorded  f.o.b,  the  two  sets  of  numbers  are
not  directly  compurable.  To make  this  data  comparable,  we take  c.i.f/  f.o.b
ft..ors  from  the  International  Financial  Statistics  (IMF)  for  Turkey's  nine
major  trading  partners  in  the  OECD.  Celasun  and  Rodrik  (1988)  (who  use  an
across  the  board  8  correction  factor)  apply  another  correction;  they  lag
trading  partner  data  by no less  than  three  months  to correct  for  the  time
spent  in transport.  This  would  seem  excessive  given  Turkey's  proximity  to its
main  trading  partners,  Germany  and  Italy.  Since  no  higher  frequency  data  are
available  than  quarterly  data,  we go  to the  other  extreme  and  make  no
adjustment  for  this  lag.  This  would  seem  more  appropriate,  since  transport  to
these  countries  takes  at  most  a few  days.  Overestimating  the  time  spent  in
transport  leads  to  a strong  upward  bias  it she  estimate  of overinvoicing  in
the  post  1980  period  since  exports  were  growing  so rapidly.
Figure  1 summarizes  the  results  of the  exercise  for  the  period  between
1969  and  1987.  RXNO  corresponds  to exports  to  non-oil  countries  based  on
Turkish  data  while  RXNOC  corrects  for  the  difference  between  the  records  in
Turkey's  main  9 OECD  trading  partners  and  the  Turkish  records  on  exports  to
these  countries.  Especially  in tne  late  1970s,  exports  to the  OECD  have  been
subject  to  under-invoicing,  presumably  because  of the  much  higher  black  market
premium  in  that  period  (cf  Fig.  1;).  But  starting  in 1981,  there  is  over-
invoicing.  It reached  its  peak in  1984,  at 28  percent.  The  subsequent  decline
in over-invoicing  corresponds  to  the  period  in  which  export  subsidies  were
reduced.  In 1987  however,  over-invoicing  has gone  up again,  because  of the
introduction  of large  subsidies  in  late  1986.
But  altogether  the  conclusion  should  be clear  from  Fig.l:  the  partner-
country  data  comparisons  reveal  some  over-  and  under-invoicing,  but  really  not
to  a substantial  extent.  The "corrected"  figures  still  show  a  very  sharp
increase  in exports  to the  OECD.  Thus  the  Turkish  export  boom is for  real.
There  are  several  factors  which  have  contributed  to the  Turkish  export
boom  since  1980.  Outward-oriented  growth  policy,  the  sustained  real
depreciation,  export  subsidies,  and  very  favorable  market  conditions  in  the
Niddle  East,  at least  until  1984,  have  all  played  a role.  Real  exchange  rate
depreciation  and  the  boom in  the  oil  countries  have  beer  b,rought  up already;
we therefore  turn  immediately  to the  export  incentive  regime  below,  in Section
2.2.
2.2  Export  Incentives
2  The  source  of  the  data  is  the  Directions  of  Trade  Statistics  data  tape
compiled  by the  IMF.5
Many Turkish  exports  quality  for  as  many  as five  export  incentive
regLmes. First,  for  many  sectors  a  deductlon  equal  to  20  percent  of export
earnings  Is  allowed  in  calculating  taxable  income,  provided  total  annual
exports  exceed  US$250,000.  In  addition  to  exports  of  manufactured  goods,  the
20  percent  export  allowance  is  also  available  for  exports  of fresh  fruits,
vegetables  and  seafood,  international  tiansportation  earnings;  certain  tourist
income;  and  construction,  repairs,  and  technical  services  performed  abroad.
An export  allowance  of 5  percent  is  avr'Xable  for  traders-exporters  who  are
not  the  producers  of the  exported  goode.
A further  export  subsidy  is  providJd  in  the  guise  of  a dravback  of
indirect  taxes  borne  in  the  course  of  manufacturing  in  Turkey.  Rebates  are
provided  at rates  that  originally  ranged  from  2-1/2  percent  to 20  percent.
Assignment  of products  to  one  of  several  lists  (originally  9 lists  i.e.,  one
for  each  rate  of 20,  17-1/2...and  0) is specified  in an  official  list  that
ostensibly  depends  on determination  of the  indirect  tax  content  in  various
commodities.  However  in 1986  the  rates  have  been  scaled  down  to  only  49
percent  of their  original  levels.  In  addition,  many .tems  on the  list  have
been  shifted  from  higher  to lower  rate  categories,  and  some  rebates  were
eliminated,  such  as the  one  on textiles.  The  rebates  were eliminated
igether at the  end  of 1988.
Large  exporters  benefit  from  a global  drawback  based  on  annual  total
qualifying  earnings  of net  foreign  currency.  Turkish  law  makes  provision  for
export  companies  that,  by concentrating  total  exports  of  smaller  producers
into  one  unit,  can  benefit  from  the  maximum  export  rebate.
A third  export  subsidy  is given  through  favored  foreign  exchange
allocation  and  duty-free  imports.  Exporters  who  hold  export  encouragement
certificates  can  apply  to  get  foreign  exchange  for  their  import  needs  and/or
receive  the  right  to duty-free  imports.  These  duty-free  imports  are  limited  to
between  40 to 60  percent  of the  amount  exported.  In  addition  to this,  whenever
there  is  black  market  premium  over  official  exchange  rate,  exporters  would
benefit  by having  direct  access  to foreign  exchange  at the  offical  rate.
Fourth,  in  addition  to  all  this,  extra-budgetary  funds  provide  further
export  subsidies.  The  Resource  Utilization  Support  Fund  (RUSF)  provided  export
subsidies  at a rate  of 2  percent  (down  from  4 percent)  of gross  exports
carnings,  without  adjustment  for  domestic  content.  But  export  subsidies  from
the  RUSF  were discontinued  in  November  1986. However,  in  January  1987  the
Support  and  Price  Stabilization  Fund (SPSF)  started  providing  export  subsidies
to  several  commodities  on the  basis  of volume,  not  value,  of exports.  This
change  should  eliminate  the  incentive  for  over-invoicing  of exports  that  was
embedded  in  the  earlier  system  of  value-based  incentives.
Finally,  the  fifth  and  last  incentive  category  consists  of export
credits,  extended  at interest  rates  below  prevailing  market  lending  rates.
Under  the  export  credit  rediscount  scheme,  exporters  holding  certificates  and
reaching  minimum  levels  of  exports  are  entitled  to obtain  preferential  credit
for  up to 25  percent  of their  export  commitment.  The  interest  rate  for  such
credit  is 38  percent,  far  below  market  lending  rates  over  the  entire  period
under  consideration.
The  measure  of  _  port  subsidies  used  in the  econometric  analysis  below
incorporates  the  last  four  categories  of subsidies  given,  all  converted  Into
ad-valorem  equivalents.  However  the  first  subsidy  category,  deductlons  from
taxable  corporate  income,  has  not  been included;  it is  difficult  to convert6
into  a general  measure,  as  its  value  depends  on the  tax  situation  of  each
individual  firm.
3  Structure  of the  Model  and  Estimation  Results
The  model  presented  below  focuses  on the  interplay  between  export
incentives,  the  real  exchange  rate  and  foreign  factors  influencing  demand  for
Turkish  goods.  The  emphasis  is  on three  major  decisions,  two  by Turkish
entrepreneurs  and  one  by potential  foreign  consumers  of Turkish  goods,  and  the
way  policy  influences  those  decisions.  First,  how  does  the  incentive  to  sell
at  home  rather  than  abroad  depend  on relative  prices  of  home and  export  goods,
inclusive  of  export  incentives?  Second,  of  what  entrepreneurs  decide  to sell
abroad  for  any  given  relative  price  structure,  how  much is  reported  so as to
collect  on export  subsidies,  and  how  much  goes  unreported  so as to  exploit  any
difference  between  black  market  and  official  exchange  rates?  Third,  for  given
relative  price  of  Turkish  exports  and  competitors'  output,  how do foreign
consumers  allocate  their  expenditure?  How  does  that  decision  change  when
relative  prices  do?
We assume  that  the  relative  price  of exports  moves  so  as to  reconcile
the  resulting  aggregrate  supply  of  Turkish  exports,  reported  or  unreported,
with  aggregate  foreign  demand  for  Turkish  goods.  We keep  exogerous  both
foreign  prices,  summarized  as P',  and  the  price  of Turkish  goods  sold  at  home,
P.  We  will refer  to  P/(EP^)  as the  real  exchange  rate  e. P,  is  the  absolute
price  of exports.  The  relative  price  of Turkish  exports  can  thus  be defined  in
two  different  ways;  with  respect  to foreign  goods,  p,*-P,/(EP*),  or  with
respect  to  home goods:  pk - Pd1P.  3/  These  two  relative  nrices  are  linked
through  x.he  real  exchange  rate:  p,*-pb  e.
Endogenizing  export  prices  allows  us to address  the  important  question
of  which  way  export  incentives  are  shifted,  backwards  to  domestic  entre-
preneurs  or forward  to foreign  consumers?  The  answer  to this  question  is  an
important  input  in  any  assessment  of the  welfare  impact  of export  subsidies.
At the  same  time,  maintaining  the  real  exchange  rate  exogenous,  i.e.
determined  outside  the  model,  allows  us to  escape  introducing  a full-blown
general  equilibrium  model  of the  Turkish  economy.  The  use  of such  a full  blown
GE  model  would  have  made  it  all  but impossible  to  use  only  fully  estimated
relationships,  something  we consider  essential.
3.1  Model  Structure
Assume  there  is  one  good  produced  in  Turkey,  y, which  can  either  be
exported  or sold  at  home.  The  home  price  is  P, and  the  unit  benefit  of
exporting  equals  x-.  ax  may  differ  from  Px  because  of export  subsidies  or
exchange  market  arbitrage  with  the  black  market  in  ways  to  be defined  below.
We assume  rising  marginai  production  costs  (expressed  in terms  of  home goods):
(1)  c-c(y),  c'>O,  c''>O.
3  We use  capital  letters  for  absolute  prices  and  lower  case  letters  for
relative  prices.7
If  goods  are  sold  at  home there  are  no further  distrlbution  costs.  If goods
are  exported,  additional  costs  are  incurred  depending  on  how  far  away  from  the
harbor  firms  are  located.  For  given  location,  we assume  fixed  unit  shipping
costs  sx(l),  with 1 an index  of  distance  from  the  harbor.  s,(l)  is  also
expressed  in terms  of  home  goods.  We assume  a continuous  distribution  of firms
over  the index  1  and  unit  shipping  costs  that  increase moothly  with  distance.
Each  firm  maximizes  profits:
(2)  max,  (y(l)-x(l)))  +  (w 2/P-s,(l))x(l)-c(y(l))  s.t  OsxSy
The  first  order  condition  for  y(l)  ties  down  each  firm's  total  output:
(3)  c'(y(l))-l
As to exports,
(4)  x(l)  - y(l) if (w,-s,(l))  2 c'
0  if  (Wr-s 2(l))  <  c'
In fact,  firms  are  indifferent  between  exporting  and  selling  at  home in  the
case  of an  equality.  We simply  assume  that  a tie  results  in  exports.  This is
of no consequence  because  it  happens  at  only  one  support  point  in  a continuous
distribution (4)  yields,  after  aggregration,  an  aggregrate  export  supply
function:
(5)  x/y  - f(r 2/P)
Consider  next the  decision  to report  exports  or  not.  In  practice
unreported  exports  can  take  different  forms  and  can  be positive  or  negative.
Positive  unreported  exports  result  from  underinvoicing  or downright  smuggling
out.  Negative  unreported  exports  can  result  from  overinvoicing  or, in
extremis,  from  reporting  exports  that  in  fact  never  took  place  (fictitious
exports).  Both  phenomena  have  been  widely  reported  in  response  to  Turkish
export  incentives.  Fictitious  exports  are  particularly  easy  to implement  for
exports  to countries  with large  contingents  of  Turkish  workers  such  as  West
Germany,  Switzerland  or the  Netherlands  because  of  often  close  personal
relations  between  exporter  and  importer.
We adopt  a stylized  model  in line  with  some  similarity  to the  smuggling
literature  (Pitt  (1981),  Martin  and  Panagarya  (1984)).  Reportinit  exports
implies  eligibility  for  export  subsidies  xs (defined  as  ad valorem  subsidies);
against  this  plus  point  is the  minus  point  of foregoing  the  opportunity  )t
exchanging  foreign  currency  receipts  at the  more favorable  black  market  rate.
Define  the  black  market  premium  (the  black  market  rate  over  the  official  rate,
minus  one)  as  0.  Revenues  from  exporting  are:
(6a) wrx  - P(l+xs)x 0 +  P,(l+#)(x-x 0)
where  x0 represents  reported  exports.8
We assume  that  the  chance  of  being  caught  increases  with the  share  of
exports  going  unreported,  and  that  a  penalty  proportional  to sales  Is  imposed
once  an  exporter  is caught.  Thus  revenue  net  of expected  penalties  are:
(6b) P2(l+xs)x 0 + PF(1+4)(X  Xo)  - Pxx7(x 0/x),  7r<0.
Maximizing  (6b)  with  respe_t  to  x0 for  given  total  volume  exported  thus  leads
to  a simple  expression  for  the  share  of exports  reported:
(7)  x./x  - g((l+xs)/(l+0))
Note thay  due  to  overinvoicing  and  fictitlous  exports,  the  expression  in (7)
can  exceed  one. (5)  and (7)  together  fully  determine  supply  of Turkish  exports
and  the  degree  of overinvoicing,  underinvoicing  or faking  export  receipts
altogether.
Finally  demand  for  Turkish  goods  abroad.  We 'issume  foreigners  have  a
nested  CES  utility  function,  with  aggregrate  foreign  and  home  goods  in level
one  and  the  foreign  good  split  up over  Turkish  goods  and  other  imported  goods
in  level  2 (cf  Kharas  (1989)  for  a  similar  approach).  This  leads  to standard
demand  functions:
(8a) M*/A*  - h(Ph./PH.A*),
(8b) xd/M - k(PX/P*,M*M)
Inserting  (8b)  into (8a)  and  taking  log-differences  yields  one  of the  two
specifications  used  below:
(9)  dlog(xd)  - c0  +  o1dlog(p,/pm*)  +  c7 1 ydlog(Ph./PM*)  +  a20 2dlog(A')
at  are  the  elasticities  corresponding  to (8b)  and  7V  the  elasticities  of
equation  (8a).  "dlog'  refers  to logdifferences:  dlog(x)-log(x)-log(x(-l)).  The
other  specification  used is (8b)  directly.
Market  clearing  requires  (10)  to  hold:
(10)  X  - Xd
(10)  determines  an  equilibrium  value  of  P,  for  given  values  of P, PM and  so
on.
3.2  Econometric  Results
All equations  are  estimated  using  TSLS.  The  instruments  used  are  listed
in  the  appendix.  Consider  first  the  export  -. :ply equation:
(11) log(x/y)  - 2.38  + 0.96*log(rpxy)  & 0.81*log(rpxy(-l))
(5.26)  (2.95)  .-. 76)
+ 0.66*log(rpxy(-2))  + 0.51*log(rpxy(-3))
(3.86)  (1.56)
R2 - 0.68,  TSLS,  SHPL  - 72-899
where  rpxy-P,(l+xs)/P.  The  *quation  shows  a  very  strong  supply  response  to
relative  prices  (inclusive  of export  subsidies).  No good  results  were  obtained
with inclusion  of the  black  market  premium;  the  smuggled  part  of total  exports
is  apparently  too  small  for  this  variable  to show  up significantly  although  it
should  be part  of  is.  Note hat  x is  total  Turkish  exports  measured  from
foreign  trade  statistics  where  available  (see  the  data  appendix  for  details).
This  equation  is  estimated  on a subset  of  9 countries  because  of limited
availability  of counterpart  trade  data.  In  particular  the  Middle  East  had to
)he  oxcluded,  but the  nine  largest  trading  partners  outside  the  Middle  East
were in  the  sample  (see  data  appendix  for  details).  Note  incidentally  that
X,/x  can  exceid  1.
(12) log(xo/x)  - 0.05  +  0.30*log((l+xs)/(l1+))
(3.11)  (3.88)
R2  _ 0.44,  DW - 1.79,  OLS,  SMPL  - 67-87
Not  surprisingly  there  is  a substantial  residue  of unexplained  variance,  but
one  thing  is  clear.  The  share  of total  exports  that  is actually  reported  and
thus  shows  up in the  Turkish  trade  statistics  is  highly  sensitive  to the
relative  attractiveness  of  reporting  versus  not  reporting  as  deteramined  by
subsidies  and  the  black  market  exchange  rate  premium.
As to export  demand,  we looked  separately  at exports  to  oil  exporting
countries  (x,)  and  exports  to other  countries  (x,).  Consider  the  latter
first.  Analysis  of the  error  structure  of the  equation  showed  that  frt
differencing  was  necessary  for  stationarity  (auto  correlation  coefficients
below  one).  Estimation  of  equation  (9)  yields  the  following  results:
(13a)  dlog(x,,)  - 0.03  +  0.83*dlog(Px/(EPm*))  +  0.33*dlog(P 1 (-l)/(EPw(-l)))
(0.42)  (1.61)  (0.68)
+  0.27*dlog(Ph./Pm,)  +  1.32*dlog(A)
(0.26)  (0.66)
R2  - 0.31,  TSLS,  SMPL  - 71-87
The  equation  performs  rather  poorly  as specified;  in  particular  the  terms
involving  substitution  on the  first  level  (home  versus  foreign  goods  in  the
country  exported  to)  come  up  with  very  insignificant  parameter  estimates.  We
therefore  reestimated  the  equation  on the  second  level  only,  focusing
exclusively  on competition  between  Turkish  exports  and  other  exports  to
Turkey's  export  markets.  This  yields  better  results:
(13b)  dlog(xnO)  - - 0.01  +  1.l5*dlog(P/(EP".))
(0.18)  (2.48)
+  0.26*dlog(P,(-l)/(E(-l)P,.(-l)))  +  1.50*dlog(C)
(0.64)  (2.45)
R2 - 0.43,  TSLS,  SMPL  - 69-8710
Equation  13  shows  a  significant  and  moderately  high  price  elasticity  and  a
significant  and  high income  elasticity.
The same  equation  for  exports  to  oil  exporting  countries  yields  results
that  may come  as a surprise:
(14) log(xo)  - - 10.2  +  7.73*log(P 2/(EP0.. ) +  1.36*log(M 0*)
(2.35)  (4.46)  (3.48)
R2 - 0.78,  TSLS,  SMPL  - 67-87
The  equation  shows  a  moderate  income  elasticity  (with  respect  to overall
imports  into  the  Middle  East)  but  an extremely  high  price  elasticity.  Contrary
to folklore,  these  markets  seem  extremely  competitive.
4  What  was  behind  the  Turkey  exDort  Miracle?
In this  Section,  we use  the  model  to  assess  the  relation  between  the
real  exchange  rate,  exports  and  competitiveness  and  address  the  question  of
the  incidence  of export  subsidies.  1oo  they  mostly  accrue  to exporters  or to
foreign  consumers?  We then  use the  model  to assess  the  relative  contribution
to the  Turkish  export  miracle  of the  real  exchange  rate  (really  shorthand  for
the  macroeconomic  policies  that  supported  the  time  path for  the  real  exchange
rate),  of foreign  variables,  and  of the  export  incentive  system.
4.1  Export  Subsidies,  the  Real  Exchange  Rate  and  External  Competitiveness.
In the  first  experiment,  we implement  a  20 percentage  points  export
subsidy  xs.  An important  question  is,  to  whom the  subsidy  accrues;  is  it
shifted  forward  to  benefit  foreigners  or does  it  go into  increased  profit
margins  of exporters?  With  perfectly  elastic  supply,  higher  ex  ante  profits
for  exporters  will lead  producers  to shift  into  exporting  until  profits  are
baxck  down,  shifting  the  entire  benefit  to foreign  consumers  as long  as there
is  a finite  price  elasticity  of demand.  Without  any  supply  elasticity  (or  more
generally  with a supply  elasticity  below  the  demand  elasticity)  most  of the
subsidy  will  be translated  in  higher  profits  for  producers  ratehr  than  lower
prices  for  foreign  consumers.  Fig.  2  shows  the  answer  for  Turkey  using  the
model  developed  before.
The  middle  graph,  RPXYF,  shows  the  export  price  (expressed  in  terms  of
home goods)  in the  base  run,  without  subsidy.  The  lines  above  and  below  rpxyf
represent  respectively  the  equilibrium  producer  (PXPROD)  and (foreign)
consumer  price  (PXCONS)  once  the  twenty  percent  subsidy  is  implemented.  With
complete  forward  shifting,  towards  foreign  consumers,  PXPROD  and  RPXYF  would
coincide,  with the  full  208  benefit  accruing  to foreign  consumers.  In  that
case  PXCONS  would  consistently  lie  20*  below  the  pre-subsidy  price  RPXYF.  With
complete  backward  shifting,  all  subsidies  would  accrue  to  domestic  producers.
There  would  thus  be no decline  in  foreign  consumer  prices.  PXCONS  and  RPXYF
would  coincide  and  PXPROD  would  consistently  lie  201  above  RPXYPF.129~  ~  ~  ~~~1
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Figure 2: RPXYF:  relative price of exports to home goods before imposition
of  export  subsidies.
XPXPROD: Producer price of exports, in terms of home goods and after
imposition  of a 204 ad valorem export subsidy.
XPXPROD: (Foreign)  consumer price of exports, in terms of home goods
and after imposition  of a  204 ad valorem export subsidy.
The figure demonstrates that the subsidy is mostly shifted  backward to
producers for most of the simulation  period. Initially  more than two thirds of
the subsidy goes into increased  profit margins. a percentage that after seven
years still stands at a little under fifty  percent. There is, however, a
significant affect on fictitious exports and overimvoicing: the ratio of
reported over actual exports goes up by no less than 5 percentage points on
average,  making for a much stronger response of recorded than of actual
exports. Thus the conclusLon that export subsidies, in spite of an apparent
effect on recorded exports, are not a very effect:Uve  tool to increase export
volumes; most of the  benefits accrue for many years to home producers rather
than to foreign  producers.
Consider next a change in the relative  price of bome goods in terms  of
imported  goods, what we have referred to as the real exchange rate. A 10
percent real depreciation  will, for given relative price of exports to  home
goods, substantially increase demand for exports, thus putting upward pressure
on the price ratLo of goods sold abroad versus goods sold at home. The not
effect again depends on demand and supply elasticities.  The model run suggests
that the real depreciation initially goes for almost 7% out of 10 into  higher
export prices  in  terms  of  home goods,  a  share that  declines  gradually  to  5%
after seven years. In terms of foreign goods the reverse  happens;12
competitiveness  Initially  increases  by no  more  than  3%,  a  percentage  that
gradually  increases  to  reach  5%  after  a  few  years.
4.2  The  Sources  of  Turkey's  export  growth.
Consider  next  the  analysis  of the  factors  contributing  to  Turkey's
export  growth.  We first  ran  a benchmark  cese  (BMARK  in  Figure  3)  with the
following  characteristics:
A  the  real  exchange  rate  stays  at the  value  it  had in  1979.
B  No export  subsidies
C  Import  growth  in the  oil  export  countries  equals  5% in  each  year  of the
simulation  period  (80-87);  this  makes  it  equal  on average  to the  imporc
growth  in  Turkey's  OECD  trading  partners.
We then  ran  simulations  relaxing  these  assumptions  step  by step.  First  the
actual  real  exchange  rate  is  restored  (BRER  in fig.3).  Then  actual  export
subsidies  are  added  (BRERXS  in fig.3).  Finally,  actual  import  growth  in the
oil  exporting  countries  is  restored;  in  this  run  actual  exports  are  reproduced
(RXWSU).  The  figure  lisxts  what total  exports  (actual,  i.e.  based  on trading
partner  data)  would  have  been  in  each  case.
In the  benchmark  case,  exports  would  have  been  no less  than  74%  lower
than  they  actually  were  by 1987.  The  initial  impact  would  have  b.en lower,  but
still  substantial  (36%).4/  The  figure  shows,  first  of  all,  that  the  bulk  of
this  spectacular  growth  in  Turkey's  exports  can  be ascribed  to the  impact  of
the  real  depreciation  of the  TL.  No less  than  64  of these  74  percentage  points
can  be ascribed  to the  impact  of the  real  exchange  rate (cf  the  lines  BMARK
and  BRER  in  Fi3.2).  Second,  export  subsidies  had  a significant,  albeit
substantially  smaller  effect:  the  third  run,  BRERXS,  adds  export  subsidies,
which  adds  a further  23  percentage  points,  bringing  the  total  over  the  74%
increase  between  benchmark  and  actual  values,  to  a total  increase  of 87%  in
1987.
How  can this  apparent  puzzle  be explained?  How  come  export  subsidies  and
real  exchange  rate  developments  explain  more  than  the  actual  increase  in
export  volumes?  The  answer  is  simple  albeit  surprizing.  Over the  period,  the
Middle  East  has in  fact  had  a  negative  (i.e  less  positive)  impact,  bringing
exports  down  from  an 86 to 74  percent  increase  between  80-87  (Fig.2).  This  is,
one  should  note,  by comparison  to  a case  where  oil  importers'  import  growth
grows  at the  rate  observed  in  Turkey's  trading  partners  in  the  OECD.  Fig.  2
shows  what  is  happening:  there  we plot  both  total  imports  into  oil  exporting
countries  and  what  these  imports  would  have  been  had they  grown  at the  average
growth  rate  of imports  by Turkey's  main  trading  partners  in the  OECD (5%).
The  decline  after  1:85  does  not  completely  offset  earlier  gains,  but  certainly
makes  them  a  great  deal  less  impressive.
'  Percentages  are  calculated  as  log  differences._ 33
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Y:Lgure  s:  Actual  and  Counterfactual  export  volumse;  BMARK:  Benchmark  case;
BRER:  Benchmark  came  plus  actual  real  exchange  rate  changes;  BRERXS:  Benchmark
came  plus  actual  real  exchange  rate  changes  and actual  export  subsidies;
RXWSU:  Benchmark  case  plus  actual  real  exchange  rat*  changes.  actual  export
subsidies  and  actual  real import  growth  Lnto  oil-exporting  countries.14
5  CoDnlusionsl
The  outcome,  to  summarize  our  conclusions,  must to  some  extent  come  as  a
surprise.  Import  growth  in  the  Middle  East  in  excess  of import  growth  in  the
rest  of the  world  has in  fact  made  a  negative  contribution  to  Turkey's  export
boom over  the  period  1980-1987.  Overall  imports  into  oil  exporting  countries
have  been in  precipitous  decline  since  1984,  in  belated  recognition  of  the
fall  in the  price  of oil  of a few  years  before.  Over  the  period  80-87  it  is
thus  difficult  to  explain  the  surge  in  Turkish  exports  from  that  angle  alone,
as our  model  simulations  confirm.
As to the  exports  to  non-oil  countries,  we confirm  the  pattern  of
overinvoicing  found  by earlier  researchers:  there  was indeed  a switch  from
underinvoicing  to  overinvoicing  concurrent  with the  switch  in  export  incentive
regime  and  exchange  rate  policy  in the  early  eighties.  But  this  switch  was
nowhere  near  enough  to  explain  a significant  part  of the  export  "miracle'  as a
mere  accounting  trick.  Even  on corrected  data,  as reported  by trading
partners,  Turkey  sustained  a  real  export  growth  rate  of 20%  over  the  1980-
1987  period,  and  17.5%  percent  to  the  non-oil  countries.
With the  oil  boom  out  as  an explanation  of the  export  boom,  two
alternative  explanations  remain.  Of these  other  two  alternatives,  export
incentives  and  the  set  of  policies  allowing  real  depreciation  of the  exchange
rate,the  latter  contributed  by far  the  most,  as the  econometric  analysis  makes
clear.  In fact  the  simulation  analysis  suggested  that  export  subsidies  were
mostly  shifted  backwards  into  higher  producer  profits  rather  than  forward  into
lower  (foreign)  consumer  prices,  thus  explaining  the  moderate  contributions  of
the  export  subsidies  to the  export  boom.
Thus,  to sum  up,  there  was a  Turkish  export  miracle,  even  after
extraneous  factors  such  as  an oil  boom  in the  Middle  East  are  accounted  for;
and  it  was,  much  more  than  a response  to  explicit  export  incentives,  a  result
of  macroeconomic  policies  and  trade  reform  that  allowed  a steady  real
depreciation  of the  Turkish  Lira.
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